

DD/A Registry
File Meetings 1

DD/A Registry
77-4765

24 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 FROM: Michael J. Malanick
 Acting Deputy Director for Administration
 SUBJECT: Briefing of Other Agency Personnel on
 Role of CIA
 REFERENCE: Memorandum to ADDA from [REDACTED]
 25X1A [REDACTED] O/DCI, dated 13 August 1977.
 Subject: Briefing of Other Agency
 Personnel on Role of CIA (ER 77-2047) 25X1A

1. Action Requested: None; for information only.

2. Background: This will respond to [REDACTED] request of 13 August for information about briefings given by the Office of Training to other agency personnel on the role of CIA.

a. In September 1951, the Office of Training (OTR) established an Orientation and Briefing Division and assumed the responsibility of providing briefings on the Role of CIA to various and sundry groups, including all elements of the U.S. Government requesting such a briefing. Over the years, OTR has serviced almost all such requests, the major exception being those requests, usually from the War Colleges, specifically addressed to the Director or his deputies. By way of illustration: Since 1951, newly designated Military Attachés have been briefed and, since 1953, newly appointed Foreign Service Officers have been briefed by OTR.

b. Apart from the above briefings given by OTR officers, OTR also administers programs for U.S. Government audiences utilizing speakers from all the Directorates. Typically, these are one-day visits to CIA or individual speakers lecturing in one of the courses at the Defense Intelligence School.

DDA REGISTRY BACKGROUND

SUBJECT: Briefing of Other Agency Personnel on Role of CIA

c. The overall briefings invariably give special attention to the work of the CIA field stations abroad.

d. Attached is a list of institutions and courses in which enrollees receive a briefing on the Role of CIA, at the minimum.

3. Recommendation: None.

/s/ Michael J. Malanick

Michael J. Malanick

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig 4 1 - Addressee
1 - ADDCI
1 - ER
2 - ADDA

Attachment

I. Department of Defense

A. Defense Intelligence School (DIA)

1. Attache Course
2. Joint Intelligence Operations Course
3. Defense Intelligence Course
4. Civilian Analysts Course
5. National Senior Intelligence Course
6. Defense Reserve Symposium

B. National Cryptologic School (NSA)

1. Senior Cryptological Course
2. Military Officers Advanced Cryptologic Course
3. Civilian Analysts Course
4. Senior Military Cryptologic Supervisors Course
5. NSA Junior Officers
6. NSA Interns
7. NSA Reserve Officers Course

C. U.S. Army

John F. Kennedy Military Training Institute (Fort Bragg)

D. JCS/DIA Orientation

E. Miscellaneous Occasional Appearances

1. USAF Academy
2. Bolling AFB
3. Malmstrom AFB
4. Junior Officers Council, Foreign Technology Division, USAF
5. Naval Reserve Intelligence Management Course

II. Department of State and USIA

A. Foreign Service Institute

1. Basic Foreign Service Officer Orientation
2. Intelligence and Foreign Policy Course
3. Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy
4. Administrative Operations Course

B. Work-Study Groups

C. U.S. Ambassadors

III. Agency for International Development

- A. Washington Training Center
 - 1. AID Orientation
 - 2. AID Career Training Program

IV. Civil Service Commission

- A. Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va.
- B. Executive Seminar Centers
 - 1. King's Point, N.Y.
 - 2. Oak Ridge, Tenn.

V. Summer Intern Groups

- A. USIA
- B. HEW
- C. GSA

Dr. Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Congressional Budget Office,
House Annex No. 2, 2nd and D Streets, S.W., Washington, DC
20515

25X1A

ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

Harry E. Fitzwater
Director of Training

DATE: 23 AUG 1977

DDA Subject

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DD/A Registry	Executive Registry
77-4584	77-2047-6

Date: 13 August 1977

→ TO: A DDA
FROM: [REDACTED] ✓

SUBJECT: Briefing of other Agency Personnel on
Role of CIA

REMARKS:

An employee recently wrote the DCI commentin
on the lack of briefings of employees of other
agencies on the importance of the role of the
CIA abroad.

I know that we have some briefings of others.
Would you please have the D/Training or other
appropriate officers prepare a memo for the
DCI which would say what efforts we make to
acquaint others, and anything we know about
what they may use in their courses on our
activities. Do we furnish speakers, for
example, to FSI courses, DIA, etc.?

The theme of the employee's letter is that
because other government agency employees do
not understand and appreciate what we do, they
sometimes avoid us, work against us, [REDACTED]
etc.

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DD/A Registry
77-5311

DCI/DDCI
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Enclosure Req'd
77-29973

DPA
DDCIA Registry

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI		/ X	12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDMX A X	X		16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Will you please review the content of the briefings we give in indoctrination and other courses at State, Defense and elsewhere to ensure that we give sufficient emphasis to the theme of cooperation and our role in providing intelligence to support the foreign relations initiatives and military concerns of our State and Defense associates.

25X1A I believe that the recent Presidential Directive,
25X1A reorganization steps, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] afford us opportunities to stress these themes--the "teamwork" concept. I want you to give special attention to my forthcoming message to
25X1A Chiefs of Station
[REDACTED]


DCI/ADCOCK
24 SEP 1977

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 23 Sept. 1977
TO: The Director		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: An employee has written you calling for more cooperation among elements of the U. S. Government, especially abroad. Also attached are DDA's comments about our participation in training courses of other agencies. I've drafted a response to the employee, and a note you may wish to send to DDA asking that we review our training course presentations to stress the cooperation and intelligence service themes. 25X1A		
FROM: [REDACTED] <i>Al</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB '55REPLACES FORM 36-B
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Washington, D.C. 20505

77-204760

24 September 1977

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[REDACTED]

A belated thanks for your thoughtful letter about the need for more cooperation among the elements of our government, and particularly within the Intelligence Community. I agree that this is a serious problem, and I have been working on it.

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[REDACTED]

While our new agreement and my message will stress cooperation, as you point out, so much depends upon personal relationships. There is an element of competition involved, and each one of us needs to strive to promote more of the cooperative spirit in each of his dealings with colleagues in other agencies. I hope that some of the steps we are taking here under the recent Presidential Directive and other reorganization moves will improve cooperation and be reflected in the field.

With regard to your specific comments about training courses, I asked for a report and see that we regularly participate in the orientation and other courses of the Departments of State and Defense and others. I am told that our briefings give special attention to the work of CIA field stations. I appreciate your writing about this and would welcome any more specific proposals you might have on how to improve cooperation.

Thanks again for your letter.

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Y [REDACTED]

STANSFIELD TURNER

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AF/ [REDACTED]
3B 630, Headquarters Building

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DD/A Registry

File *Meetings!*

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: John F. Blake Deputy Director for Administration		EXTENSION [REDACTED]	NO. DDA 77-2740
			DATE 13 May 1977 STAT INTL
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. DCI			Sir: I understand you are to meet with the Agency MAG group on Monday afternoon. That group has recently shown interest in the Agency policy, as implemented by the Office of Security, on matters pertaining to homosexuality and cohabitation. There is attached as background for you a memorandum for the record of a briefing on security given to Director Bush on 19 August 1976. Included, among other things, are Agency positions on the matter of homosexuality and cohabitation as it pertains to its applicants and employees.
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10.			John F. Blake Deputy Director for Administration
11.			DDA/JFBlake:lm (13 May 77) Distribution: Orig RS - DCI w/att ① RS - DDA Subject w/att 1 RS - DDA Chrono 1 RS - JFB Chrono
12.			
13.			Attachment: Memorandum for the Record from Director of Security, dated 1 September 1977, Subject: Briefing of DCI.
14.			
15.			

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1 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Briefing of DCI

1. On 19 August 1976 I briefed the DCI with respect to the overall CIA security program. The briefing was conducted in the DCI's office. The Deputy Director for Administration was present during the briefing.

2. I initiated the briefing by informing the DCI that I had recently talked to [REDACTED] Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, who informed me of his recent briefing of the DCI, during which a number of questions were asked concerning Office of Security policy with reference to drugs, homosexuals, use of polygraph, and a number of other security matters which [REDACTED] could not address. I pointed out to the Director that his recent request for a list of all individuals, other than staff and contract employees, who may enter the building without an escort, suggested to me that it would be helpful for the Director to get a comprehensive briefing of our overall security program.

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3. The Director acknowledged his interest in the security program of the Agency and in the Agency's counter-intelligence program, which of necessity must be very closely associated. He noted that [REDACTED] and a representative of the FBI were scheduled to brief him on Friday, 20 August 1976, concerning the CIA's and FBI's counterintelligence program in the United States. He stated that he wanted me to know, however, that his recent briefing by [REDACTED] had no relationship to his request for a list of people who have unescorted access to the building. Referring to the latter request, he stated that Mr. William Hyland, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, had mentioned to him the necessity at the White House for a periodic screening

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of the list of people who have White House passes. Mr. Hyland stated that this was necessary in order to insure that the list is kept to the lowest possible number and includes only those people who have a need for periodic access to the White House. Mr. Hyland suggested to the Director that in view of his most difficult problem because of the number involved, that he may want to assure himself that there is a viable program for purging CIA's list.

4. In view of the Director's interest in the above list I provided him with a short summary of the justification for the issuance of non-escort badges. I pointed out the various categories, GSA, telephone repairmen, contractor's employees, foreign liaison, and U.S. official liaison. I explained to him that GSA, telephone repairmen, contractor's employees, consultants, and independent contractors are provided the same type of security screening given staff employees, and that foreign liaison and U.S. liaison officers are given badges based on certifications that they meet Top Secret standards. I explained to the Director that we try to limit U.S. liaison badges to those individuals who must visit Agency installations a minimum of one hundred times a year. I noted, however, that in a number of instances Visitor-No-Escort badges were issued as a matter of protocol to senior members of the Intelligence Community who rarely visit Agency installations.

5. I also explained the IBM card procedure and the meaning of the various numbers and letters imprinted on the badges. Finally, I outlined to the Director the capability of the Security Access Control System and expressed the hope that that system will help us police more closely the Visitor-No-Escort program.

6. The Director stated he would like further discussions after he had a chance to review the list.

7. With the instant item of his interest disposed of for the time being, I initiated the more formal part of the briefing with a description of our personnel security program. I advised the Director that personnel security is our highest priority and includes, but is not limited to, our [redacted] activity, polygraph, and clearance division appraisals. 1

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I explained to him our procedure for approvals and dis-approvals. He was also informed that staff employees and contract "I" employees get the same clearance so that there is no question of assignability after an individual is accepted as a staff employee.

8. With reference to drugs, I explained our "whole person" approach to clearance and stressed that the office looks at recency, frequency, type and amount of illegal drug use before coming to any conclusion with reference to an applicants acceptance or rejection. The Director was informed that our attitude towards hard drugs is of course different than our attitude towards marijuana and so-called soft drugs, but that long continuous or habitual use of marijuana was looked at very critically and would in many instances result in disapproval. I made a specific point of emphasizing to the Director that one-time use, two-time use, or any other type of use which can be honestly described as experimentation would not, without other disqualifying information, result in a disapproval of an applicant. With respect to employees, I informed the Director that those individuals who are found to be using illegal drugs are cautioned that their use may result in disciplinary action including a dismissal and that employees have been dismissed for use of illegal drugs. The Director asked a few questions concerning our processing and then expressed total agreement with our methodology and noted that he was pleased with the sensible common sense approach to illegal drug use concerning both applicants and employees.

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9. I next reviewed the polygraph program with the Director with the emphasis on applicant processing. [REDACTED]

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I made the following points: (a) the polygraph is not infallible, (b) the polygraph phase contains only questions which relate to a security interest, (c) the program is monitored very carefully, (d) only professional security officers are recruited as polygraph examiners, (e) polygraph is an essential tool for our Agency as an aid to our investigation, and (f) the polygraph program is modern, forward looking, and includes research for both better ways and more insight into ethnic variations in response.

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10. I also noted to the Director that I felt the polygraph was a reliable tool and that statistically believed the polygraph examination was accurate in about 95% of the cases. I noted, however, that this was not to say that we could, with 100% accuracy, state whether a particular individual was or was not lying in a particular instance.

11. The Director asked what agencies in the Intelligence Community used the polygraph as an aid to investigation, or as a screening device for applicants. I informed the Director that only CIA and NSA use the polygraph for the above purposes. I noted that the FBI uses the polygraph but not for applicant screening. The Director states that from what he knew of our program, he felt it was in good professional hands and he supported it.

12. I next advised the Director of the Office of Security policy with reference to homosexuals. I informed him that if we identify a homosexual in our applicant processing the person is immediately disapproved. In the event we identify a homosexual who is an employee we encourage him to resign and cooperate with him to avoid any personal embarrassment during his exit processing. If the homosexual employee decides not to resign, the Office of Security recommends his employment termination by the Director under provisions of Section 102(c).

13. The Director stated that he had some ambivalent feelings about CIA's policy towards homosexuals. He noted that this is a question that is always posed to him when he addresses a large group of Agency employees. He advised that during his recent talk to the Summer-Only employees the homosexual question had come up. He stated that he has no problem with our attitude and policy concerning the so-called "closet" homosexual because he recognizes the threat this individual poses to our security and his vulnerability to blackmail. He stated, however, that he is undecided as to what his decision may be if we were to identify an employee who was an "open" homosexual. He stated that he was ambivalent on this point because he did not have any solid reasons for denying an "open" homosexual continued employment. He noted that there is no blackmail possibilities with reference to the person's homosexuality and that he had no information which indicated that a homosexual was any different professionally than any other employee.

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14. I informed the Director that there were two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with homosexuals who were barred by State action from fulfilling State jobs. In both cases the Supreme Court ruled that it is the proper exercise of a State's police power to set standards for employment in such places as educational institutions and having set standards which bar homosexuals, such standards are valid. I suggested to the Director that should he determine that an "open" homosexual should not be afforded continued employment in CIA I believed such a determination would be upheld by the courts. The Director stated that even if this were so from the legal standpoint, what reasons do we have which would support excluding "open" homosexuals. At this point Mr. Blake provided the Director with a number of reasons, such as morale problems, refusal of other employees to be associated with "open" homosexuals, and the propensity for homosexuals to recruit their own kind. This discussion I consider to be open-ended; the Director is not convinced that the "open" homosexual should be eliminated from the Agency. However, I feel he has an open mind on this question and would be amenable to reviewing the problem if he is provided with some factual evidence which supports an exclusionary policy.

15. Because of the recent interest in the CIA policy with reference to cohabitation, I took this opportunity to explore with the Director his feelings on this subject. I began our discussion by defining cohabitation as open and notorious living with an individual of the opposite sex who is not one's spouse. I explained to the Director our current policy concerning applicants and employees. I noted that if we develop information on an applicant which reflects that he is cohabitating we call the applicant in for a discussion. The applicant is informed that cohabitation is against CIA policy because (a) we utilize government agencies for cover and these government agencies have a policy against cohabitation and we must respect their policies and (b) the CIA Code of Conduct prohibits any activity which brings discredit or embarrassment upon the individual or the Agency and cohabitation fits this category. The applicant is advised that he can remedy the situation by moving out or have his cohabitee move out, or he can get married, or he can withdraw his

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application. If the applicant provides a satisfactory response his word is usually accepted and the processing continues. In the case of an employee, the Office of Security does not have a program which seeks out this information but if the information comes to our attention we take action. The employee is called to the Office of Security and the policy with reference to cohabitation is explained to the employee. The employee is advised that he must rectify the situation or disciplinary action, which may include termination, will be taken. If the individual gives a satisfactory answer which indicates that he will take action to end his cohabitation status his word is accepted. There is no major effort on the part of the Office of Security to confirm the employee's statement. I was careful to point out to the Director that in speaking of cohabitation, the Office of Security is speaking of a semi-permanent condition and not an overnight or weekend situation. I indicated to the Director that Mr. Colby enunciated this policy and that I would appreciate a reaffirmation or cancellation of the policy. The Director advised that he was in full support of the current policy on cohabitation. He believed that this conduct was highly susceptible of bringing embarrassment and discredit upon the Agency and believed that this policy was just another indication of the discipline our employees must accept as employees of CIA.

16. I reviewed next with the Director our policy of assigning Security Officers to components other than the Office of Security and our posture of cooperation with the rest of the Agency in contrast to that of an adversary. I emphasized that the office is very proud of its record of helpfulness and empathy for our employees and that we encourage employees to seek our help so that we may assist them in resolving small problems before they become big ones. I pointed out to the Director that the mission of the Office of Security is an impossible one without the cooperation of the rest of CIA's employees. I noted that senior members of the Office of Security take advantage of every opportunity to speak before Agency groups and to point out to them the necessity for their cooperation. In addition we seek advice and guidance from other components of the Agency and employees in their individual capacities in order to serve them and the Agency better. I noted that a very important part of our counterintelligence program is the cooperative relationship between the Office of

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Security and the Agency population. We work very hard at cultivating, encouraging, fostering, and improving this relationship. It is of upmost importance to the overall security mission of the Office of Security, that Agency employees "believe in" the Office of Security, and have respect for and an understanding of the policies established in the name of security.

17. Since the Director is well aware that the Office of Security's counterintelligence responsibilities relate to staff and staff-like personnel, and the CIA Staff is responsible for operational counterintelligence, I quickly summarized the Office of Security's counter-intelligence program. I noted that the Office of Security's personnel security program is our best protection from penetration. It was pointed out that the office has a small counterintelligence oriented staff known as the Security Analysis Group, which works in close coordination with the Counterintelligence Staff. In those cases involving Agency employees who have had extensive assignments overseas, coordination with CI Staff and other DDO components is necessary to obtain the information the Office of Security needs for its counterintelligence analysis. I advised the Director that relationships between CI Staff and the Office of Security are good but can be improved.

18. I also informed the Director that we depend upon information from the FBI, other federal agencies, and local police to provide insight into problems which when analyzed, involve counterintelligence ramifications. These matters are pursued on a low-key EYES ONLY basis to avoid embarrassment to the individuals involved. I emphasized that we seek to disprove allegations with as much fervor as we pursue our efforts to prove allegations. In other words, we pursue an evenhanded investigation attempting to develop the facts and draw proper conclusions without substantive bias.

19. The Repolygraph Program is an essential element of our counterintelligence effort. It has been in operation since January 1976 with very, very few adverse comments. I informed the Director that I believe the program has been accepted by the Agency population, probably as a result of their understanding for the need for such a program and the leadership exhibited by senior officers who have volunteered for the repolygraph as an example to their employees.

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Although we have not uncovered any information of a major counterintelligence interest, we have developed data of interest concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Since the latter information was obtained from DDO officers, I have discussed cases with Mr. Theodore Shackley, Associate Deputy Director for Operations, and together we have reached an agreement on how to pursue these cases to a final conclusion.

20. In response to the Director's question concerning penetration, I advised him that we have proceeded on the assumption that the Agency is penetrated at the staff level. However, I quickly pointed out that I am not aware of such a penetration nor do I have credible information concerning the staff or contract internal employee who may be involved with a foreign intelligence organization. The Office of Security is working with CI Staff on such a possibility but the investigation has not progressed to the point where either the Office of Security or CI Staff can state there has been improper contact with a foreign intelligence organization.

21. I next gave the Director a very short summary of our physical security program as it relates to the Headquarters building. I emphasized our philosophy of security in depth which could be illustrated as a series of concentrical circles. I noted for example the exterior fence, our entrance procedures, the exposed picture badge, our need-to-know principle, our safes, vaults, alarm systems, and the security violation program. I emphasized to the Director that if an unauthorized individual entered the building I believed the greatest damage would result from this individual planting a sophisticated tape recorder or highly sophisticated transmitter, such as a "burst" transmitter. I suggested to the Director that the security discipline of our employees and the physical security safeguards would limit the amount of classified material an unauthorized person could acquire in the Headquarters building during or after office hours. With respect to searching briefcases and packages of our employees either at the entrances or exits of the Headquarters building, I noted that this procedure was not in consonance with our overall security philosophy. I reminded the Director of our personnel security program and our feeling that once cleared for Agency employment we could trust our employees to follow our security directives and not take classified material to areas which were not

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provided with authorized safekeeping equipment. I noted that an employee who wished to take classified documents to an unauthorized location could easily do so by placing the documents inside his clothing rather than in a briefcase and that I was not convinced that briefcase inspections should be used as a routine measure. I noted, however, that we had instituted briefcase checks from time to time as a practical reminder to our employees of the Headquarters Regulation which prohibits classified material from being removed from the building to areas not provided with authorized safekeeping equipment. I suggested that this tactic would be utilized in the future but that I had no schedule for the next program.

22. At the conclusion of my briefing, which consumed approximately one hour, the Director advised that he was interested in security and in the counterintelligence program of the Agency, both as it affected operations and particularly our vulnerability to penetration at the staff level. He advised that he supports our programs, although he admitted he is not aware in depth of every aspect of the Office of Security's operations. He stated that he has great respect for the Office of Security's professionalism based on his limited contact with Security Officers. He suggested additional meetings for more indepth discussions of our security programs as his schedule would permit. In conclusion, he emphasized his availability regarding security matters, which in the opinion of the Office of Security, merited his attention. He stated that I should feel free to call him directly on matters of extreme sensitivity.

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[Redacted]
Robert W. Gambino

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